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The Comnrission of the European Commtrnities forwarded the Twelfth Report on
comperitjon Pol icy (Doc. l-253183) to tlre Etrropean Parliament' At its May
1983 part-session, the European I'arlianrent reterred this report to the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as the commiÈtee resPonsible and to
the Legal Affairs Cornmittee for its opinion'
The committee on Economic and llonetary Affairs had appointed ì4r FRANZ
rapporteur on 22 SepÈember 1982. The conrmittee considered the report at its
rneetings of l9-20 September and 27-28 September 1983, and adopted it at the
latter meeting by 13 votes to 6 with 1 abstention'
l'he f ol lowing took part in the vote:
Mr MOREAU (chairman); M. FRANZ (rapporteur); Mr ALBERS (deputizing for
Mr SCIlINZEL) ; Mr BEAZI-EY, Mr BE[IMER (cleput iz'ing, f or Mr Vergeer);
Mr VON IIISMRCK; Ì4r ttoNACCINI; Mrs DESOUCIIES, Miss F()RSTER; Mr FRIEDRICH;
Mr GIAVAZZI; Mr HERMAN; Mr LEONARDI; Mr MULLER-IIERMAN; Mrs NIELSEN (deputizing
for Mr Nor<tmann); Mr PAPAI.ITONIOU; Mr ROCALLA (deputizing for Mr Wagner);
Mr VAN ROI,IPUY; Mr I,JEDEKIND (deputizing f or Mr Schni tker) ; Mr VON WOGAU'
The opinion oI the Legal Affairs CommitÈee is attached'
The report hlas tabled on 3 October 1983'
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I'lre Cornmittee on Economic
Par 1 j ament the fol I owi ng
staEemenf:
having regard
Communit ies on
A
anrl Monelary Afiairs hereÌry sullmits
motion fr>r a resolrrtion togeLher uith
to the Eui:cpean
explana t or)'
on the Twelfth Report oI the (lo'rmission
Competition Pol icY
'l he European ParI i arnt'nt ,
MOTI ON F()R A RES()I,I]1'ION
to the I'wel f th Report of thc
Competition Policy (Doc. l-
ol [lre iluropean Commttnities on
Lomnriss i.,n of the European
"';3 /83) ,
lravi ng regard trr
Atfairs and the
rlre reporL oI
opinion of the
the (lornrnitl,t'
Lcgaì Aflairs
on Iìconomi c and Mone t a rY
(lorrrmittce (Doc. 1-39 1/S3)
l.
(ìonrpetition pc,1 icy anrl qL9_aaL_of socio-ect:n,rrrti< ul-egluxel-: rF.=irjry]!,
Reaf f irrns that a lìrrr'<-lpe,'rn ec.rnonric 1.,oi icy i:elating' Lo tlre market econÒmy
tras the perrnanerìt t.'tsk oi maintaininp antì slrcnl'ther',ir,g competition anrJ
that this mr,st not l;e sacrif iced io o..tr ional ecot.t,rtnic c,bjectives which
hava priority;
2. SLresses the vital inrltortance oi gen,'ine,,-rrtdrstorLcri colnPetition in
r'('on()rìi ( pr()cesses ancl part icularlv l ^' t 'r:lrni ca l nn<l economic progress ;
Sìt rnr,sr..; il :, ,-i>pvict iOl Lir.tt iì llArl\., 1 (,('()r-ì(rrlìV C.'lrlì{)l l)e S(lr.:ial1y ef f eCf ilte
witlr,rr:, cnnt!)(ìt it r,'ln an,i Llr;rl e a,rìri r'i.trr-tll iy thr' ('irllìIllilnitvts Competil jorl
r-,rt'l j.:v rtì v{.'v jrrrl)()1't;lrìf for- t}re t.,,^.;,i r-rìi-1 ectivts r:f t}re 'l'reaty of iìr,nre
(Ar-f i; tcr. )i'.i t .;.r; . ), tÌrr' inlt-.gr-i,t'i()n {)l llrt' l4eittb.'r Stares, the frrrt-lter
rìevr,, lr:pnrr,irf 6l ',.,. (lomrnon Marl<eL i:', tht, rì jrection of a frrl ly operative
internal mArk",i ;r,t. .,rr,rcoming the Current Severe eConOmic CriSiS;
(-onsi,llr5 jt ,..-ìs,r,i)[ r,1 I tir,rr con'],,,irtion i,e sallg'.t,;t,r'-r.l irlstitutionall" ì"'
FreAI)S ,li apir;rlpriate {rarner'ork 1r:p'sl;:t iorri
liel io'res tlraL llr,l 1,r- itltr' task itl
hetLcr pt'r f ortt,rrlc'3.', trin tìtrorry-ìr
c();rf/(,f ttr()tl 1,o1icy is to ensure fhat
(i;rjr rt"^',rrrls lor f,tlrformance), Lhar-
E
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positions of pov/er on the market are kept under surveillance (control of
dominant market positions) and that aIl those involved in Èhe market can
determine the development of the supply of goods and services by the
millions of choices they make each day (democratizalion of the market);
6. Stresses that distortions of comperition by uncontrolled national aids or
sCate Erading monopolies which are contrary to the interests of the
Community are a constant reminder of the need for an active European
pol icy on comPet i r ion ;
1. Points out that barriers to trade on the interr.ral market lead to
fundamental restrictions on competirion;
B. Regrets that despite the requests made in the resolutions on the Tenth and
Eleventh Reports on CompeÈition Policy, the present report contains no
separate clral>ter on this most important subjecr giving precise details of
the contraventions recorded, the counter-measure§ adopted by the
Commission and the Commission's thinking on the achievement of a free
internal market ss a pre-requisi te for free competition;
9. CalIs on the Commission once again to examine these matters in detail in
the next reporr on compeÈition policy even if it is necessary to solve
organizational problerns relating to term6 of reference within the
Commiss ion be forehand ;
10. I..xpects tlìe governments of the Member States to 6et aside unilateral
national interesfs and concentrate more on the achievement of a common
internal nrarkeL by abolishing non-tarifI trarriers to trade and to ensure
tllat standards, approval procedures and related national laws within the
Community are coordinated much more quickly than in the pasr instead of
being allowed to block or even counteract each other;
ll. Calls on the (lorrrrcil of Ministers, the naIiona1 governments and tlre
National parlianrents to cooperate closely with the Commission and the
European Parl iamenL 'n directing their efforts rowards achieving a fu1ly
operative European internal market as a hasis for European Union;
12. Supports the Commission in its efforts Eo monitor closely the practice of
granting subsidies in the Member States and to apply severe measures to
put a stop to the practice in proven instances of abuse;
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13. Expects the institutions of Èhe European Community to make a more vigorous
and more effective effort to ensure that where subsidies are r-rnavoidable -
and this applies both to the authorization of financing aid from the
Community and to national subsidies - they are designed to serve the
interests of the Community;
14. Affirms that naEional subsidies which are contrary Èo the European
Treaties and the judgmenE of the Community institutions must not be
tolerated since Èhey distort competition and are potentially very
damaging, from the political viewpoint, for the internal cohesion of the
Community;
15. Expects the Commission to ensure thaE all subsidies which are granted by
individual Member States are in line wiEh Community objectives and are
completely transparent, limited in duration and as far as possible
degressive;
16. Calls on the national governments of tlre !4ember States to lay down
framework conditions relating to economic, financial and social policy in
cooperation with the Commission and the European Parliament Èo enable
viable rrndertakings in the Community to use their own earning Power to
ensure their long,-term competiÈiveness without having, recourse to national
subs idies ;
17. Stresses thaÈ competition poticy must be increasingly concerned with the
effective control of international brrsiness practices which restricÈ
competition i1 rhe results achieved in the liberalization of wotld trade
are n()t to be jeoPardized;
18. Stresses that subsidies hamper free world trade and therefore run directly
counter to the closer inEegration of the developing countries in the
process of L5r'inÈernaEional division of labour, which should be promotedl
in particular, urg,es the Commission to persuade Member States, in
conjrrnction with nr.'ching steps by the USA, Japan and other countries, to
de-escalate competitive and self-defeating export credits u,hich provide
their own exporrers wich unfair advanEage;
19. Asks the Commission to monitor more closely tlre effects on fair
competition between Community firms of national ly funded overseas aid
which is tied to Purclìases from the counÈry concerned;
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20. Bclieves tiral i-ir.' t,'(.r,ì'.1 i '/ I 'l r1,r )''r , o; alr'r '--1il 'L'l{)iì3'L pr-inciiries
of (ìA11, ]ì-ei' rr''ì, ,1,' ' rl' rr' ')l-lr('1 :)'t';''iì'l
Érids, is es,seol rill -;
21. IrOintS Out ttrat rirrl:,,,i; i-\' ,Ì r r rrli ,',,','.'nr, ,:lr - ,''i1 ;, h '.1 c; l'LDt C()Iì' i I l--rtte
An alterngtrve to .i r.. Ir,ì,lr ì ,,,' 1' 'r:.] rj ,-,-'.i1, l''' { onclrlded hv walt of
exCeptiOn and for'lirrir'ì'r ,''.1 '' ,\ r'J-ri)r tii (-rr-r)r"'f il'ilrcrtCtls --'lnt"
exp6)f f p1.ggr.ilmnìbrl, (ìl I r,i i (,,ì ,,,i I ,,r,1 ,- .' ) ,' it' :r1-,:,i i1 I't' ilO Si'(bSt-i1-rlf e iOf'
innovative cilr;icir', fr'' ;'-r;r ' l' 'r""" {r(cnorry;
22. (lalls for Llrr': Cr,ri,.ri , ,
comPctiLjr;i, arr,l, ,r '" -,
tl)at ilì ',,'t,,' ,: r',, '
Pf Otl'Élnìfl1() oi' r lì r ('l- .Ìr;ì i l r rr
in jobs lr-st i,ì rl. ì ìr'
adeq rir l- : I ',, L r, 'r r
c{)InF}É'riii:r
i'r"'l"r'lll
(l !,r\l('^m(1 5 the {act
r , '-"el-'^ch
t.- r,,r it'tl.ret res'lìt
', : ì i r.in ,r''
i'.,i r it irrl
, -,-.r L- i t'iì , I
I :,,'r,l"1j; ;,;rjel,
, 
.l' il :. .., ,'\'
, ,.1 r oì- 
- 
(, ,',ì,; i i ile
,1ì Ì.',fiiriral
',-iri r ) rl I'
, ( 'i,n
, ,,rl lir-,
r.ss",l'tt i,: ì
i,t ri t,'1,.,'
l- 'ì ll
!,,!,,. i-, I l:-_:_ i _' l 
-'
'i' r,ì (i .''', ìt'l-
r' ,lr t:,- - ,r i,ì
', r-.)1\ ,f'rf,-É t-hiS
.',. iiÉ,.,, l,ì/ iirr"hlP (ì44 ì r
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would seem to be in the (lomrnrrnityts interest and cal ls on the Commission
Lo undertake a review ol tl.re contli t ions of erxenrption laid down in Article
85(3) of tlre Etc Treaty;
26. Calls for adequate account to be t.al(en of the various demands and
proposals made by the European Parlianrent in the pending draft regulation
for the exemption by category o{ the selective distribution agreements in
the motor vehicle sector and requests that the European Parliamentrs views
expressed on Commission Regularton 67/67 be considered in the guidelines
to be provided for the new IÌxcltrsive DistribuLion and Purchasinp
Regulation 1983/83 and 198t,/83.
21. Reiterates its demand that following the rulings of the Court of Justice
in the ntliz.e seed and Coditel II cases, the work trndertaken by the
Commission should be continued in collaborarion with the economic circles
concerned to ensure thaE the transfer of technology is not subject to
excessively restrictive conditions and thaL small and mediun-sized
undertakings are guaranteed Protection;
28. Fears that iI the permissible regulative scope of Iicensing contracts is
interpreted too narrowly, undertakings wili be less willing to issue
licensing agreenrents at international Ievel which might limit the spread
of new products and processes and calls therefore for a modified version
of rlre drafc regulation whiclr is to be submiIted to the Advisory Committee
orr I{estrictive Practices and Dominant Posifions to be forwarded to the
European Par I iament ;
29. llopes ttrat the air transport sector \^/ii I he increasingly subject to
Community rules on cornpetition whilsI expressing the opinion that we
should take into accorrnt the essential aspects of politics, the publi.c
sector ancì safety regulations relatinp, to this sector;
30. Reirerates it, approval of the principle of extending the rules governing
competirion to st'€ transport but reserves its opinion on the practical
proposals put toru. rì by the Commission pending the submission of a rePort
by irs ComrniLtee on Economic and Monetary Affairs;
31. Recalls its opinion on a proposal for a Cotrncil regulation on merger
controls, which refers to the neecl to avoid duplicate controls and
conflicts over Lerms of relerence and basicalty suPPorts the creation of
effective means o1 corrtrolling transfrontier Inergers;
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32. Acknowledges Ètre role of the small and medium-sized undertakings, which
can best improve their efficiency in Èhe framework of a coherent,
nrarket-orienÈate(l economic pol icy;
33. Supports therefore the programmes and specific measures adopted by the
Commission with a view to improving cooperation and Èhe promotion of the
investment potential of smal 1 and meditrm-sized undertakings and expects
tlre Commission to exploit ttre opportuniries available to iÈ in this field
more fully than in the past and - as annotrnce<ì - to seek new vrays of
encouraging Chese undertakings, bearing, in rnind that the European
Parliament should be involved in its deliberations;
34. Calls on the Commission to adopt appropriate measures to simplify
exemption declarations for aS,reements which satisfy rhe conditions set out
in ArÈicle 85(3) and acknowledges that the Commission has increased the
legal status of comfort letters to speed up the administrative procedure;
35. t'lelcomes the additional guarantees that cases will be handled objectively
during the adnrinistrative procedure as regards both inspections and the
post of lìearing Officer;
36. Supports the Comrnission's posiÈion of principle on the rtrles governing
competition and measures to reduce structural overcapacity, particularly
as regarrls the conditions which, in its opinion, musr be fulfilled for the
approval of agreemenfs which restrict competition in whole sections of the
economy;
37. i'lxpresses the opinion that approval shouid be given in the context of
programmes and initiatives adopted by the Commission to price-fixing and
quota agreements between undertakings as back-up measures in certain
jusÈilied and exceptional circumstaDces if fhey conEribute to the
reduction of stnrctural overcapacity;
Main decisions and measur taken bv the Commrssron
3ll . lì.ecognizes that
measures taken
the grrardian of
, qual itatively and quantitatively, tlre dec
by the Commission meet the greater demands
competition;
is ions and
placed on it as
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39. Expects the Commission co continue to uphold irs policy in fuÈure using
all the means at its disposal;
Renews its calls to the Comrnission for greatly expanded research on the
efficiency and competitiveness of the Communi ty economic structures
especially in a world context, and on the role of public assistance and
intervention and of mergers in the process of economic adjustment;
sEresses tlre need to incorporate the results of such research into the
actual application of competition pol icy.
IIrges once aglBin the Commission to introduce meAsures enstrring, greater
coordination between DC IV and other departments, especially those dealing
with economic, fiscal, industrial and regional problems, so as to provide
the organizational structure for inregrating the objectives of competition
policy with those of other Community policies.
Major developments in national competition Policies
40. Fears that the enlargement of the Community towards the souÈh will cause
considerable problems as regards the orientation of economic policy
Èowards Ehe market economy and the establishment of a viable level of
competition and caIls on the Commission tc» take every opportunity to make
these principles clear to the national Sovernment6;
CompeÈition policy and state aids to undertakings
4I
42. Expects the Commission to
in the formulation of the
circumstances under which
the negative impact of
determined effort than has
involve the European Parliament from the o.rtseE
planned guidelines to establish the exceptional
stste aids serve the common interest;
Welcomes ttre Commission's unequivocal stance on
state aids to undertakings and calls for a more
been made in the past to put an end to them;
43. Considers thar the Commission musÈ differentiate more clearly than in the
past between subsi.ies and funds to promote research and development and
must ensure thaÈ the latter are not blocked;
44. Supports the Commission on the implementation of the European Parliament's
proposals to restore the international competitiveness of the European
steel indusrry by restructuring and by reducing sEructural overcapacity;
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45 l,Jelcomes the fact that, at its
crireria on which it bases its
aids, l)ut notes the absence of
and weighted in the system of
request, the Commission has specified the
regional analyses when assessing regional
details on how these factors are combined
assessment used by the Commission;
46. Notes with satisfaction the successful activities of the Commission in
Eransforming, staÈe Èrading monopolies and urges it to continue its work in
this field;
/+7. Underlines the danger of the concenEration effect of national izing
undertakings and the consequenL p.rowing tendency of the Member States to
subsidize public sector undertakings at the expense of private secEor
compeEition;
48. I^Jelcomes the Commissionrs annoulìcement of investigations into the
financial relations between tlre Member States and their public
undertakings in certain sectors and hopes thaE these investigations will
be extended to other major sectors such as air transport and the banking
sec tor ;
49. Notes that nationalizalion is not prohibited by the wording of the EEC
Treaty but that it runs counter to the market economy system which also
finds expression in the Community's rules on competition;
'1.'he development of concentration, competition and competitiveness
50. l,'lelcomes the investig,ations into competitiveness, the early results of
which clearly show the substantial differt nces in the competitiveness of
variotrs sectors within the Member States and indicate possible starting
poinLs for improvemerìt and cal1s on the Comnrission to pursue these
investigations with determination;
'l'ìle Comnrission rs reactions to the European Parliament rs resolutions on the
'l'enth and Eleventh Reports on Competition Policy
51. Iìxpresses its disapproval at the fact that many of the points raised in
the previorrs reports by Mr lleazley and Mr Papantoniou on the Tenth and
I'lleventh Reports on CompeÈition Policy have received Iittle or no
attention from rtre Commission:
l^lP 04418
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tr.ro-t ier sys tem of jud ic iaI review oI Commiss ion dec is ions I ,
expedited procedures,
f urtlrer researclr into comper i t i,rn3,
applicaÈion of the rules Boverning competition to small and medium-sized
t
undertakings',
Iack of adequate copyright protection on a Community basis5,
the international orierrtation of the Commi"rion6,
stucly of the irnplicariorrs of rlìe accession of Spain and PortugalT
abolition of barriers to trade in the Commrrnityrs internal marketS
investigation into competition in the banking sector9
futl list of 
"ids10
regular consultation of Parl iarentll ;
Final remarks
.52. Points out that the Treaties invest the European Community with the
responsibiliry tor competition at home and lor free trade world wide
ttrat this impl ies a duty constantly to impr ()vt' the cl imate f or compet
53. Nr>tes with satisfaction thaC, despite the reservaÈions expressed above,
the Twelfth Report on Competition Policy is very clear and demonstraÈes
that the Commission has resolved to take nrore determined action than in
the past to uphold undisÈorted competition based on the market economy
system of the European Communities and Èo maintain it for the benefit of
the Community;
and
ition;
54. lnstructs iEs President
report by its committee
WP O44IE
Or De
forward this resolution together with the
the Council and Èhe Commission.
to
to
I
^ Paragraph 41 of the resolution on the Tentlr Report, paragraph 47 of
the resolution on the Eleventh Report2 Prrrg.rph 41 of the resolution on Ehe Tenth Report, paragraphs 50-52
^ ot the resolution on the Eleventh Report3 I'rrrgr"ph 47 of tlre resolution on the Tenth Report, paragraphs 54-58
ol the resolution on the Eleventh Report
* Paragraphs 24-26 of the resolution on the Eleventh Report) Paragraph 44 of the resolution on the Eleventh Report6Po."g.aphs 36-38 of the resolution on the Tenth Report., paragraphs 4l-45
of the resolution on the Eleventh Report7 P"."g."ph 35 of the resolution on the TenÈh ReporÈ, paragraph 40 of the
^ resolution on the Eleventh Reporto
'Paragraph 60 of the resolution on the Eleventh Report
v-Paragraph 1l of the resolution on the Eleventh Reportl0 Prtrp,rrph 37 of the resolution on the Eleventh Report
rr Parapraph 21 of the resoluÈion on the Eleventh Iìeport
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BEXPLANATORY STATEIVIENT
-
I. INTRODUCTION
1 ' The commission's TweLfth Report on competition poLicy opens with the
toL Lowìng accurate and unequ.i vocaL remark:
'Maintenance of undistorted competition is one of the fundamentaI principtes
of the free market economy on which the Community is based; the Commìssionrs
task, pursuant to the Treaties, is to secure its appLìcation'.
A sub-cLause ìn the ELeventh Report on Competition poLicy states that the
community ''is essentiaLLy based on a market economy,. The commitment to
competition and the Commission's ah,areness of i'.s task of maintaining
undistorted competition are stronger than in previous reports and uje rdeLcome
buth the plain words and the unequivocaL statements.
2' The condemnation of the protiferation of subsidies is just as unequivocaL
as the commitment to undistorted competition. trlhereas, in 19g1, the
commission referred on page 12 of its report to its positìve approach to aid
which was Limited by the need to avoid distortions of competition within the
community, the Twettth Report states qu.ite cLearLy, on page 11, that the
commission now authorizes'onty those aids which can genuìneLy ìmprove the
competitiveness of European industry and are essentìaLLy apt to ensure the
eventual creatìon of Lasting empLoyment'.
3' It is gratifyìng that the commission has Iaid much greater emphasis thanin the past on the importance of the European ParLiament and on the scope and
c(lntent of cooperation with the European ParLiament. This is apparent even
from ilìe presentation of the report. cooperation w.ith the European
Parliament and jts importance for competìtion poLicy ìs now deal.t with in a
somewhat longer section at the very beginning of the report rather than in
sectiorr 1 of chapter 6 as in the EIeventh Report. 1,1hereas the ELeventh
Report states/ .i n an aImost condescend'i ng manner, that parLiament rs
suggestìons are often qu'ite he[pfuL (p. 1o1), the new report states (p. 1g)
that ParIiament's annuaL discuss.ions of the commissionrs reports on
compet'ition poLicy are of partìcutar importance. There shouLd be greater
coordinat ion between Commi ssion and parLiament.
rdP 0441E
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The commission shoutd, ìn particuLar, take greater advantage of
opportunities for consuLting the European parLìament informaIty in instances
where no formaL opinion from ParLiament is prescribed, in order to ensure thatbasìcaLly para[[eI measures a'imed at enforcing the princìpLes of competition
are coordinated as ear[y and as thoroughty as possib[e under the economìc
poL i cy of the European Communi ty.
4. Thìs report contains an
Commì ssionr s Twel.f th Report
i ssues deaLt with eIsewhere
topics of ma;or importance.
anaLysis of the main.issues deal.t with in the
on Compet ition poLicy. It merety touches on
in Partiament and [ooks in depth at a number of
sect'ion II concerns competition poLicy and che roLe of socio-economic andpoLiticaI interest groups. sect'ion III contains an examination of
compet ition ooticy wìth regard to undertakings wìth speciat reference to
speciaIization and dìstribution agreements, patent [ìcensing agreements, the
appLication of the ruLes of competition to air and sea transport, merger
controLs, smaLI and medium-sized undertakìngs and measures to reduce
structuraI overcapacity. It atso contains the European parLiament,s
proposaLs on new procedures- section IV incLudes comments on the maindecisions and measures taken by the commission as seen from parLiament,s
viewpoint' Section v provides a brief survey of the major deve[opments in
natjonat competition poLicies and inctudes references to the entargement ofthe Community.
Section vI contains a discussion of competition por.icy with regard to
state aids to undertakìngs with particuLar reference to controIs on a.idgranted by ìndìviduaL ttlember states and to the transformation of state trading
monopoLies and pubLic undertakings. A number of probLems concerning thedeveLopment of concentration, competition and competitiveness are examined in
section vII and finatIy, ìn section vIII, cons.ideration ìs given to the
commìssion's reactions to the opinions and demands made by partiament in its
reports on the Tenth and Eleventh Reports on competition poLicy.
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g roups
II. Competition poLic and the roLe of soc io-economic and poLiticaL interest
1. The key to the community's market economy system'is the freedom of
economic actìvity, bounded and di rected by competition and the Law.
Competìtion is a means of bring'i ng consumers'w'i shes to bear on the market
and of ensuring the most cost-efficient use of production factors for the
economy as a whoLe.
The conditions of competition therefore mean that constant efforts must be
made to meet the requ'irements of the popuLation in order to maintain
profits. Compet'ition is aLso a process by which soIutions to probtems are
fourrd. This incIudes such'innovations as the introductìon of neu products,
processes and types of organization. New goods arc not invented by consumers
but by undertakings which deve[op them and offer them to the consumer who then
deterrnines the econom'i c success of each innovat'i on under the conditions of
competition.
?- The sociaILy commìtted market economy has proved its economic and sociaL
potentiaL over more than 30 years and despìte a great dea[ of hostjLity.
This system is based on the market mechanism and on competit'ion. The state
is respons'ib[e for Layrng down the framework of the system in which the
prìvate econom'ic groups operare and for correcting sociaLLy and economicaLLy
undesìrabLe aspects of the market. A number of changes have taken pLace in
the economic order of many Community countries in the past few years. It has
ttndergone further deveLopment and not.l operates under generaI conditions which
ditfer quìte substantiaL[y from those of the 1950s. The basic principLe that
the Less the state has recourse to direct intervention the better the economic
process usuaLLy operates js stiLL vaLid, atthough'it is increasingLy ignored.
J. The task of an effective Community competition poLicy is therefore to
uphoLd the centraL importance of competition for the European Community.
It w'iLL be of particular ìmportance ìn the immediate future ìn view of the
corrtinuing economic crìsjs and'i ts effect on European integrat'i on. Onty
unfettered and undìstorted competition wiLI maintaìn the fuLL dynamìsm of the
economy, provide adequate stimuLation for technìcaI and economic progress and
provide the best possibLe guidance for the totaL'ity of economìc processes.
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4. Externat economic factors are of vitaL ìmportance in thìs context. A
fuLLy operative Community internaL market'is the soLe means of maintaining the
competitiveness of European industry in the face of internatìonaL
competition. In addition to this, the very comptex and diverse nature of the
Community's external trade - as d'istinct from that of the USA or Japan - means
that the community must advocate a free wortd system at alL times. The
Long-term poLitica[, sociat and economic consequences of a retapse into
protectjonì sm wouLd be di re.
5. The decìsion to aboLish duties within the European Community as taid down
in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 was to Lead to the creation of a European
internaL market. The major sources of growth in the economy of the post-war
period were unLeashed. For 1 5 years, trade witir in the European Community
deveLoped much faster than trade with the rest of the world. Todayr 25 years
after the founding of the European Community the free internat market of the
European Community has stiLL not been achieved, contrary to the sp.irit and the
tetter of the Treaties, contrary to the wishes of the European ParLjament and
the Commission and contrary to the requ'irements of the Europe of the present
and the future.
6. Compet'it ion 'in the European Communi ty ì s constant ly hampered by barriers
to trade. The pressure of unemptoyment in the past few years has led to an
increase in non-tariff technicaI and adm'inistratìve barrìers to trade which
prevent the creation of a free market within the European Community and are
diametricaLLy opposed to the objectives of the Community.
Ioday' rough[y DM 6501000 m worth of trade or approxìmateLy 5571, of the
externat trade of the Community countrìes is done on this internaL market.
Accord'ing to figures supptied by the Commission, exist ing restrìctions on
trade currently resuLt in costs equaL lo 5Z of totaI turnover within the
commun.ity or over Dtl 301000 m, whìch could easiLy be put to much better use
eLsewhere. No Community country can afford to negLect the Common Market.
But the posit'ive effects of a fuLLy operative ìnternaL market couLd be much
greater as can be seen from the American and Japanese markets. trle must
endeavour to achieve this aìm. NationaL barrìers to trade must not be
aLtowed to jeopardize the resuIts achieved by the dìsmanttìng of tariffs.
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7. Earriers to trade which restrict competition Lrithin the Community ar.ise
prìnc'ipaL Ly as a resuLt ot:
- disadvantages caused by cLear preference being given by pr.incipaLs to
tenders from their own country despite the competitiveness of tenders
submìtted by competitors from other countrìes and by open or covert
subsidizing of domestic f.irms,
- obstac[es caused by differing LegisLatìon in the Commun'ity countries and a
Lack of harmonization of taxation, by security and technicaI standards, by
veterinary and sanitary regutatìons, consumer protectìon and envi ronmentat
reguLations which are appIied differentLy in the various Commun'ity
count ries,
- trade restrictions caused by obstacLes to goods traffic at the internat
borders of the Community, by deLays at border checks and by excessive red
tape and paperwork.
8- wlany undertakings in the Community countries which woutd fotd under the
conditions of free competition are supported in an effort to reduce
unempIoyment in the country 'i n question. Exports are encouraged whi l.st
ìmports are dìscouraged. ALthough some Hember states have become
particuLarIy adept at this practice, none can be exonerated from vioLation of
the basic ruLes of the EEC Treaty concern'ing the defence of competition
against distortion.
9. The Commission right[y sees the publ'ic sector as one of its main concerns
in the field of competition poLicy. This was not atways the case. In the
earIy days, the commission llas concerned aLmost exctusiveIy with monitoring
undertakings, a task which is cIearIy much easier than pitting itseIf agaìnst
the might cf the Member states on which it ìs dependent in a number of
respects. The additional powers granted to the Commission to carry out this
irnportant task are very weIcome.
Ihe issue at stake in the debate on the economic system is the future of
Europe. If we are unabte to overcome protectionism and estabtish a genu.ine
'internaL market, then GATT, which has far fewer means at its disposa[, has no
change of succeeding with the Liberatization of worLd trade. There can be no
unìty or setf-assert'ion for Europe without economic integration.
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10. ParLiament's reports on the Tenth and ELeventh Reports on Competition
PoLicy cat[ed for consideration to be given to barriers to trade in the
internat market'in the next report on competition. Th'is request was s'impty
ìgnored ìn the E[eventh Report and in the new report the Commission has mereLy
paid Lip-service to Partiament's wishes. It admits, on page 10, that
reinforcement of competition and consoLidation of the unified market go hand
in hand and refers in other pLaces, e.g. pages 18-19, to the importance of the
internat market in competition potìcy.
11. In addition to barriers to trade ìn the internaL market, competition is
severeLy restricted by the subsidies, which are the worst form of
protectìon'i sm.
There has been a growing tendency tot,lards state aids and subsidies'in the
past few years aLthough thìs subject has been dìscussed in detaiL in the Last
three Commission reports. lrJe must cont'inue to stress the fact that
subsidies, and particuLarLy maintenance subsìd'ies, are one of the greatest
enemies of competition and the cause of many undesirabLe trends in the
European economy. Maintenance subsìdìes prevent the cLosure of oLd fì rms
which are no Longer viab[e and create many obstacLes which prevent competit'ive
fìrms from mak'ing the profits wh'ich are essentìaL to finance the modernizatìon
needed to maìntaìn jobs ìn the Long term.
12. Subsidies Iead to major distort'iorrs of competition in the European
Community. Their eftect has been that, ìn many cases, sectors which were not
exposed to competìtion are not competitive r.rn the wortd market today.
Subsidies stifLe the economy's decisjon-mak'ing capacity, potentiai and
w'iLIingness to take risks wh'ich are the bui Lding bLocks of a market economy.
They reduce the adaptabi Lity of individuaL undertak ings whì Lst Limiting the
effect'i verress of the mechanìsm controLL'i ng the market economy and reducìng the
productivìty and etast icìty of the economy as a whoLe.
13. If we do not make a more determined effort to put an end to the
proL'i f eration of subsid'i es in Europe, many sectors wi [[ cease to be
compet'i tive wìthìn a few years. Some subsìd'i es are, of course, essentiaI but
they must be compLetety transparent, subject to strìct deadLines and
degressìve.
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It is most encouraging that the Commission's statements of principIe
coincide with the European ParLìament's basic demands on th'is subject. The
'importance of stringent measures is refLected in the fact that the TweLfth
Report on Competition Po[ìcy Lists twìce as many aìds as the Eteventh Report-
14. The general principLe that the Less the state has recourse to direct
intervention, the better the economìc process operates, ìs stiLL vaLid but ìs
'increasingLy ignored wìthìn the Community. The growìng betief ìn the controL
of cycLicaL fLuctuatìons and the guidance of economìc processes has resuLted
in an increase in state intervention in these generaL processes and in the
decision-mak'in9 processes of ìndividuaL undertakings worLdwide. States
intervene more and more in'instances of actual or putative sectoral, cycLicaL
or structuraL weaknesses or fauLts, usuatLy w'ith the pretext of maìntaining
jobs 
- and there are endLess opportunities for intervening ìn the generaI
economìc process. They range from reguLations, such as bans and admissìon
restrìctions, and measures reLating to externat trade, such as tarìffs and
quotas, to subsid'ies, i.e. financiaL ass'istance and tax incentives. However
justifietj and reasonabLe these individuaL measures may be, they al.L infLuence
the deveLopment of the economy as a whole. Some areas of production are
favoured and others dìscouraged. ConsequentLy, many probLems have onty
become criticaL because the orientation and sanction mcchanisms buìtt into the
market have been put out of action and the search for effective sotutions to
probtems concernìng the market economy has been hampered, resuLting in fatse
adjustments and distortions. Intervention in one sector has Led to
disturbances'in other sectors thereby creating the need for intervention in
those sectors too. This is prec'iseLy what the market mechanism is designed
to prevent.
15. An effective econom.ic poL'icy designed to open up competition'is of vìtaI
importance tor the EEC Member States. The ma'intenance of free externaL trade
pLays an essentiaL part'in this poLicy. In most cases, externat trade ìs the
onLy means of creating markets of sufficient s'ize to aLLow us to take fuLL
advantage of Lower prices made possibLe by Large quant'ities of goods without
Lessen'i ng the intensity of compet'i tìon.
16. RoughLy haLf of the Commun'ity's exports go to countries outside the EEC.
The Communìty currentIy has on average the Iowest customs tarìff in worLd
tracJe in industrìaL products; ìt has fought for the deveLopment and
maintenance of tree worLd trade but the fight against protectìonist tendencies
is of cruciaL importance'in times when the rate of expansion in worLd trade is
decLìning.
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|ile must constantty demonstrate our commitment to free wrotd trade and to
opening markets for exports from the deveLoping countries. The shortage of
rau materiats in Europe means that we are more dependent than atmost any other
region of the worLd on free world trade. Free worLd trade is our onty means
of earning the currency tre so desperately need to pay for our.imports of oiL
and raw materiaIs. Ue constant[y forget that trade increases with growing
industrial'ization. tte shoutd encourage the industriaLization of the
devetoping countries as this wiLL resuLt in increased competition and provide
us with fresh impetus. The Lack of competition which we have witnessed in
many sectors has meant that some industriaL'ists have taken the wrong decisions
or no decisions at at[ and that some have fail.ed to innovate enough and have
misjudged future prospects. [.le need more free trade and hence more
competition in Europe and not more protectionism if hre are to avoid gambLing
ahray our f uture.
17. Protectionism is a contagious disease which is as rìfe today as the plague
was in the Middte Ages and vhich is just as deadty. If we do not increase
competition and reduce protectionism, t.le not only run the risk of seeing the
current grave structurat crisis become a worLd economic crisis but we wiLt
also endanger our democratic systems. Never in the history of the Communìty
has so LittLe stood betfèen the blessihgs and curses of its economic poLicy.
As a market, an economic unit and a polit'icaI force, the vast territory of
Europe is a btessing. It remains a btessing desp'ite the endtess compromises
which have to be made between partners who are stitt very unequal.
The l'ìember States appty dif ferent f ramework conditions to sa[es,and price
formation, systems of taxation, interest rates, technicaL specifjcations and
the levet of state intervention in the freedom of their undertakings to make
decisions.
18. The Communityrs ìnternationaL economic reIatìons have gone through three
very different phases of devetopment since the second tdorLd tdar:
an initiaI phase, lasting untiL 1960, of stabte nominaI exchange rates and
retativety Littte in the way of comptex internationat trade patterns
a second phase in the 1960s with retativety smatL fLuctuations in exchange
rates, the cost of raw materia[s fatLing in reaI terms and the expansion
and growth of externaI economic reLations
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a third phase lrith the price of oiL, energy and other rau materiats rising
in reaI terms coupted Hith massive shifts'in the internationat system of
exchange rates.
t.le are stiLt in this th'ird phase. It is marked, particutarLy in the o[d
industriaLized countries, by minimat growth of the domestic economy in reaL
terms, high inftation rates, a massive transfer of purchasing pohJer to the
oiL-producing countries, high unempIoynrent, dectining productivity, attempts
to restrict free wortd trade and competition and, as a resu[t, minimaI growth
'in the totaL volume of uortd trade.
Uortd trade, wh'ich in the past Has largeLy the domain of the oLd
industriaLized nations with the less developed courrtries being reduced for the
most part to the status of suppLiers of cheap raw materiats and energy and of
wetcome outtets for industriaI exports, wit[ (have to) undergo a
transformation as a resutt of the change in rotes in the process of the
internationat division of labour which is based not on the short-term
exptoìtation of the supremacy of the industriaL'ized nations and oi[-producing
countries, but on a tair division of labour for the good of a[[ concerned,
'ì.e. an ìncreased dìvision of Labour wortdwide as a t.lay out of the present
internationat structuraL adjustment crisis.
19.8asicaLty speaking, votuntary restraint agreements are a substitute for
prohibit'ive tariffs and they aLso prevent the circumvention of tariffs by
means of price cuts. 0fficiaI restrictions are imposed on foreign suppIiers
of goods in demand on the home market. This effectiveLy means that domestic
consumers are denied access to some of the goods which they would Like to
buy; the restriction of suppty atso prevents price cuts uhich woutd otherwise
filter through the system. Even more than in the case of 'nursing'tariffs,
the consumer atso lras to pay for the backwardness of his national industry
and, if things go wetL, for its renovation.
Votuntary restraints may create a breathing space for domestic industry
but they aLso sap the drive to introduce new ideas and further postpone vitaL
adj ustment s.
20. There is evidence to suggest that Lre can counter the'Japanese chaItengel
without recourse to protectionist measures, as witness the dynamic strategies
pursued by two European manufacturers of machine tooLs.
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MAH0 was one of the first to appLy the Japanese model of mass production
and standard'ization and has managed to achieve remarkabLe resuLts under
condit.ions of free competition. The company manufactures universaL miLLing,
dri LLìng and boring machines and CNC machin'ing centres us'ing standardized
techniques (m'iddLe-range technotogy) and mass product'ion. It unquestionabLy
hoLds first pLace on the European market for CNC mach'ining centres of the size
ìt makes, beating even the competition from Japanese modeLs. This success is
the resutt of the skilful combination of standardizat'ion, mass production, a
high degree of comfort, highIy devel.oped manufacturing and assembty techniques
and swift adaptabi L'ity to market trends-
TRUmpF is an exampLe of a manufacturer brirnmìng with new ideas who has
been able to carve out and extend its market at home and abroad by virtue of
speciaL'ization and the tatest in high technoLogy.
The company manufactures sheet metaL working machines and CNC sheet metat
machining centres for punching, nìbbLing and Iaser cutting. The wortdrs
f .irst NC sheet metaL mach'ining centre t.las produced in 1967 and the worLd's
first CNC pLasma cutting machìne with no adverse envìronmentaL effects in
1981. As far as the technotogy ìs concerned, TRUmPF Leads the wortd and is
one of the most advanced firms in the sector. A new deveLopment centre t.Jas
set up in 1980.
?1. For a long tìme, Europe has tuLLed'itsetf into beIieving that the
practicaL reasons for Japanrs competitìvenesS are Lower 1..|a9es, SociaL
contrìburtions, taxes and interest rates in arddition to new factories and
advances in the use of automation and that this kind of inequaIity between
different countries witI virtuaLLy baLance itseLf out in the Long term by the
adaptation of generaI economic processes, e.g. changes in exchange rates.
A few examp[es wiLI demonstrate how far beh'ind the tìmes Europe is:
- ln 1970 there were only a few Japanese product.ion industries in Europe -
today there are over 100. RoughLy 261000 European workers receive their
wages - inclirectty at Least - from Japan.
Forty new Japanese f ì rms have been f ounded 'i n Europe s'i nce 1980. So f ar,
Japan has ìnvested a totaL of DM 21500 m in Europe.
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- Accordìng to figures suppL'ied by the manufacturerrs association in Tokyo,
the va[ue of the machine toots manufactured in Japan in 19g2 was $3rAOO m,
which h,as more than the vatue of those produced in the usA ($2,900 m).
tdest Germany, which [ed the Hor[d for a long time, was in third pLace with
$2,400 m.
- In October 1982, there yere 4r1101 Japanese citizens tiving in the
Community:
t{est Germany
United Kìngdom
F rance
Ita Ly
Be[9ìum
Net he r Iands
Greece
Denma rk
Repubtic of Iretand
Luxembourg
141436
13.400
9,724
31250
3,216
?r133
1,019
594
222
107
In December 1982 there were 171112 European citizens tiving in Japan,
of whom 101917 were r.iving in Tokyo and the surrounding area.
- There are unfortunateLy no statistics on how many of the Germans and
Europeans in Japan speak Japanese and horl many of the Japanese in Germany
or the Community speak German.
According to the estimates of the German chamber of Trade and Industry in
Tokyo, however, there are at least ten times as many German-speaking
Japanese in west Germany as there are Japanese-speaking Germans inJapan' This shortfatl' on the German side is particutarty noticeab[e
amongst students as there are fifteen times as many Japanese students of
German as there are German students of Japanesel the figures are 31000 :200' It is unIikety that the ratio in other European countries is any
better.
Al'though the European economy is stitt discovering many new technoLogies 
-
Europe stiLL issues more [icences to Japan than it receives - it tags
behind Japan in their practicaL appLication. There are many exampLes toprove that discoveries are often made in Europe whiLst innovation takesptace in Japan.
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III. Compet'ition poLicy with regard to undertak'ings
S pe c i a L i z tì on_ag re e men t s
22. The Commiss'ion has adopted a new reguLation on exempt'ion by category of
speciaLization agreements whìch came into force on 1 January 1983. The new
regutation takes up the basic princ'ipLes contained in the previous regulat'ion
and extends them tor tifteen years. In order to ensure that speciaLization
agreements do not resuLt in a Loss of competition in a substantiaI proportion
of the goods concerned, exemption by category wi[[ onty be vatid if the
undertakingsr share of the market does not exceed 15L and the totat turnover
of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 300 m ECU (wìth a 102 margin of
toLerance). For the first t'ime, exemptions by category are being granted for
speciaL'ization cooperation arrangements'in Community undertakings so that from
nor.l on agreements under which the parties undertake to manufacture certain
products or arrange for their manufacture on a joint basis are admissib[e.
This ìs a h,etcome devetopment.
23. The new text retaìns the s'ignificant restriction taid down ìn earLier
reguIations on speciaL'izat'ion, that exemptions by category appLy onty to smaLI
and medium-s'ized undertakìngs (Articte 3(b)). As in German Law, major
undertakings requi re ind'ividuaL exemptìon. A cruciaL question for the future
is whether the Commission witI succeed in deve[oping procedures to speed up
the time-consuming and compLex system of granting indìviduaL exemptions under
Artic[e 85(3) of the EEC Treaty. Durìng tatks on European competition pot'icy
between the FederaI Association of German Industry (BDI) and the
Directorate-GeneraL for Compet'ition heLd on 14 January 1983, it was announced
that this matter t.touLd be given the h'ighest priorìty in future.
'i on ag reement s
24. Against the back<;round of pers'istant differences of opinion between the
Commiss'i on, European ParLìament and ftìember States on a foLLow-up reguLation,
the Comm'ission extendecj t.- 30 June 1983 Regu[ation No.67167IEEC on exemption
by category of excLusive distribution agreements, wh'ich ulas vatid unt'iL
31 December 1982. The deLiberations on a fotLow-up reguLation to this were
continued on the bas'is of new Commission proposaLs. The Commission sti LL
cons'i ders'i t essentiaL to introduce two separate regutations for excLusive
dìstrìbution agreements and excLusive purchasìng agreements for resaLe
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purposes t.lith specìaL arrangements for greements concerning brewery suppIies
and fi ILìng stat'ions. tJhereas there are no fundamentat differences between
the Cornmission and the Member States on the draft regutation for examption by
category of excLusive distrìbution agreements, the draft regutation on
exemptìon by category of excIusive purchasing agreements st'i LI raises
considerabLe probtems, part i cutarty as regards the speciat arrangements
governìng brewery suppties and fi LLìng stations.
!a1e1t_L]cgn:1 ng_ag reement s
25. Havìng heard the parties concerned on the draft for exemptions by category
of patent Licensing agreements in 0ctober 1979, the Comm'ission announced that
it did not intend to contìnue its work on the draft untiI the Court of Justice
had g'iven its ruLìng on the maize seed case (Judgment of 21 September 19781 0J
No. L 286 0t 12 october 197E).
The judgment of the Court of Justice'in Case No.258/78 (ttlaize seed case
of 8 June 198?) and its subsequent judgment in Case No.262181 (Codìtel II of
6 0ctober 1982) are the first 'instances of consìderation of the admissibil.ity
of obLigat'ions between the Licensor and the L'icensee in the Light of the ban
Laid down in ArticIe 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. The basic ruting g'iven in both
judgments is that territoriaL excLusivity as such was not subject to the ban
'imposed under ArticLe 85(1).
26. The proposaL for a regutation on exemption by category of patent Licensing
agreements current Ly under consideration must contribute to a rationaLization
of the probLems concerning the appLication of ArticLe 85(3). It must ensure
cIarity and certa'i nty as regards the LegaL sittration and create a more
favourabIe cLimate for research and deveLopment projects and the transfer of
techno Iogy.
It shouLd under no ci rcumstances deter undertak'ings from signing Lìcensing
agreements but shouLd make patents and industriaL property rights instruments
of compet ition and of technìcaI and economìc progress.
ALL undertakings must have the opportunìty of participat'ing in the
exchange of technoLogies and know-hou i rrespective of thei r size. A more
active Lìcensing market ìs an important pre-requ'isite for speeding up the
process of innovatìon which is ìn itseLf a worthwhi [e objective.
Ot*118
De
WP
0r
-26- PE 86.038/fin.
Air sng gea lrsneper!
27. A viabte Levet of competìtìon in the transport network presupposes that
atL those invotved ìn the market operate under roughty equaL conditions.
State-owned companies and companies receiving consìderabIe support from the
state, as competition free from the threat of bankrugtcy, have as littte pLace
in a market based on competition as do monopoties, cartets and other
concentrations of market power.
?8. The fact that the a'ir transport sector has so far escaped Community
regutations, untike other transport sectors, and is subject onty to various
natìonaI reguLations and interests and to supranationaL agreements between
compan.i es, has admittedty resutted'i n an operat'i ve European air transport
system but it has aLso created a system of tariffs wh'ich is complex even for
the speciaList and is compteteLy impenetrabLe for the consumer and has Led to
a Lack of transparency on the market and the compartmentaIization of nationat
markets which can onLy be remedied by compet'ition. Competit'ion, which
ensures that the market operates for the benefit of consumers, presupposes
that aLl. the competìng undertakings have equaL opportunities. These equat
opportunities are certainLy not yet avaiLabte'in air transport and the
framework conditions for creat'ing them must be developed before the sector can
be opened up to free competition.
Thìs wit[ ìnvotve a transìtionaL period simiLar to those required in the
past for the raiLways and the road and inLand waterway transport sectors.
It wiLI take some tìme to estabIish tree competjtìon'in this sector but it
wì[L be possìbLe to make a number of ìmproveme,,ts in the current unsatis-
factory situation ìn the medium term by increas'irrE the'inadequate LeveL of
compet'i tìon as a resuLt of the Commission regur.ation.
29. A speciaL mot'ion for a resoLution on sea transport is currentLy before the
European ParL'iament and we must not antìcìpate the outcome here.
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Me rggr_cont ro L s
30. t.thiLst Art'icLes 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty provide adequate coverage of
the obL igations and rights connected with the maintenance of competitjon
taking account of exìsting structures - as reported in the exptanatory
statement to the European Partiamentrs motion for a resolution on the proposaL
for a regutation on the controL of concentrations between undertakings - there
has to date been no means of preventing mergers whìch restrìct or even
eLiminate competitìon ìn some sectors in the Community. In future, a
European CarteLs 0ffice shoutd take precedence over the nationat cartets
offices to prevent nationaL restrictions which do not serve the European
interest.
It shouLd be borne in mind during the formulation of merger control
measures at Commun'i ty LeveL not onty that the current econom'i c structures'i n
the f{ember States are stitL very different and that the parameters for
assessing the benefìts or disadvantages of mergers differ significantLy, but
atso that the existing Legat instruments gìve d'ifferent forms to the type of
controI exercised.
31. The Commissionts second attempt to create measures for controtLing trans-
frontier mergers shouLd therefore be wetcomed ìn principLe. The foL[owing
additìons, atready requested by the European Partiament, shoul.d be made to
this reguLat'ion:
(a) the avoidance of dupIication in the controIs exercised by European and
nat ionaL author.i tìes,
(b) the eLim'i nation of confL'i cts over terms of reference as betueen the
authorities mentioned in (a),
(c) measures to ensure that the Communityrs terms of reference cannot be
invaLidated by nationaL activities.
AppL'icat'ion of_the_ruLes_'f gompstition to_smaLL_and_medium-ireq gngleltgkings
32. The Commission's ptans for sma[[ and medium-sized undertakings in the
fieLd of cooperation between undertakings and promotion of investment
potentiaL are a positive deve[opment but unfortunate[y, the Commission does
tdP 0441 E
0r De
-28- PE 86.038 ltin
not make futL use of the opportunitìes avaiLabte to it in this sector as a
whote. It faiLs to comment on the [ong-standing request for a European taw
on,sociétés anonymes'or on the activities of the BrusseIs cooperation office
which is primarity designed to promote greater cooperation between smaIt and
medium-sized undertakings within the Community countrìes but which has more
recentLy been entrusted with new tasks reLating to third countries and
appLicant nations.
33. The exemption of measures to promote innovation and ìnvestment potentiaL
in smaLL and medium-s'ized undertakings from the basic ban on subsidies is a
positive step. Regrettabty, the report makes no mention of the fact that
smaLL and medium-sized undertak'ings are pLaced at a competitive disadvantage
by the huge subsidies granted to major undertakings which they are requìred to
hetp finance uith their taxes. The abolit'ion of subsidy competition in
internationaL trade is one of the fundamentat principLes of the poLicy
reLating to smaLI and medium-sized undertak'ings as laid down in the ftlagna
Carta of smaLI and medium-sized undertakings.
lrccadgres
34. The European Partiament wetcomes the fact that the Commission has
increased the tegaL status of comfort Letters in the case of agreements which,
prima facie, raise no probLems in relation to the rutes of competition and
therefore require no formaL decis'ion, particuLarLy in the form of negative
cLearance, as these measures wiIt speed up the administratìve procedure.
prior pubLication in the 0fficiaI JournaL wiLI enabte third parties to express
their opinion. This new procedure, which was first announced in the ELeventh
Report, witI not on[y speed up the administrative procedure but wiIL atso
counter the criticism hich has been LeveILed at comfort Letters.
It is criticat of the fact that despite'its statement ìn the Eteventh
Report, paragraph 15, the Commission has taken no steps to simptify exemption
decLarat'ions for agreements wh'ich cLearLy satisfy the conditions of ArticLe
85(3) of the EEC Treaty. In the Eteventh Report, the Commission expressed
the hope that simpLificat')n trouLd make 'it possibLe specificaLty to soLve the
vast numbers of probtems arising in connection with these agreements and
having the same bas'ic features. ParLiament maintains ìts demand that the
Comm'ission shouLd adopt the necessary measures in accordance with the
statement made 'i n the Eteventh Report.
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35. The introduction of an expLanatory memorandum giving detaits of the scope
and Iimits of the powers of the officers responsibte for carrying out
inspections and the rights of the undertakings under inspectìon is a positive
step towards responsibLe and equal treatment based on the rute of Law.
The explanatory memorandum seems to be a su'itabte instrument for reducing
or even dispeLLing m'istrust between undertakings and the Commission.
The Commission's reminder to the undertakings concerned that they must
provide the officiaLs with information beyond the scope of the documents
requested is a standard requirement to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
RegrettabLy, the TweLfth Report contaìns no detaiIs of its examination of
the possibil.ìty referred to in paragraph 25 of the Eteventh Report of
entrust'ing the inspection of documents containing business secrets of another
undertaking to accountants or 'fiduciaries'.
The Commission decided not to introduce the system of administrative taw
judges modetled on the American system but created in the'ir place the post of
Hearing 0fficer with extensive terms of reference. This officiaL wi LL
obviousLy nou play a key part in the administrative procedure but the extent
of his independence from the Commission is stiLL a matter of some concern.
The fact that, from the administrative viewpoint, the officiaI betongs to the
Directorate-Generat for Competition indicates the need for an improved LegaI
channel independent of the Commission to deaI uith decisions taken by the
Commission under carteL Iaw.
36. In the Eteventh Report, the Comm'ission decided to inst'igate a two-tier
system of judìc'iaI review in whìch the court of first instance woutd examine
both the de facto and de jure aspects of a Commissìon decision (administrative
act) wh'iLst the second court wouLd confine itsetf to matters of Iaw (revision).
The Commission aIso pointed out in the Eteventh Report that the worktoad
of the Court of Justice, as the so[e rev'iew body, was excessive. The fact
that the TtreLfth Report s'inpty ignores this centraI issue of the two-tier
system of judiciaI revìew is totaILy incomprehensibIe.
The creation of the post of hearing officer is not an acceptabLe
atternative to an'independent system of judic'iaL review. Partiament
maìntains its demand that the Commission take the necessary steps to improve
the [egat review of its decision under carteL law.
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I ule : gf_c ompe t i !j on_a nd_me alule: lo_rgdgcg s t r u c t u r a [-ove r c a pa c i t y
37. The Comm'ission has expressed its concern at the fact that the current
economic crisis has Led both states and undertakings increasingty to adopt
measures wh.ich jeopardize the market economy thereby threatening the continued
existence of the European Community. It therefore advocates an active poticy
on competìtion to overcome our present econom'ic difficul't'ies and caIts for a
poLicy of austelity as regards state aìds, carteLs and abuses of power'
It is onLy prepared tO CondOne agreements in restraint of competition
which retate to a sector as a whoLe provided they are aimed sole[y at
ach'ieving a coordinated reduction of overcapac'ity and do not otherwise
restrict f ree dec'ision-makìng by the firms 'invotved. The necessary structuraL
reorganization must not be achieved by'unsuitabLe means such as price-fixing
or quota agreements'nor by state aids which [ead to artificaL preservation of
surptus capac.ity. Even if we agree lr'ith the basìc position adopted by the
Commìssion, price-fix'ing and quota agreements might be considered as possible
back-up measures in indiv'iduaL cases pursuant to the UNICE proposaL'
j8. parIiament weLcomes the condìtions Iaid down by the Commission for
approvaL of cartets formed during a structuraI crisis:
The agreement must conta'i n a detai [ed and b'i nding programme of ctosures for
each production centre, which ensures, on the one hand, that overcapacity is
.irreversibLy d.ismantLed and, on the other, that t.,h'i Le the ptan is in operat'ion
no new capac.i ty is created, except for repLacement centres prov'i ded foili n the
reorganizatìon programme. It must be Limited {rom the outset to the perìod
necessary for the technicaL impLementatìon of t," env'isaged programme of
cutbacks. The creat'ion of a system for exchangìr,g informatìon to check that
promised reductìons of capacity are being imptemented is admissìbte provìded
.it does not in any way he[p to coordinate on the utitìzation of remaining
capacity or to aIign condìtions of saLe.
IV. rYlain decisions and measures taken by the commission
3,9. rrJhen considering the practicaL decìsions taken by the Commission, speciaI
attention must be given to the proceedings against British Tetecommunicatìons'
Th.i s undertaking had, in the Commission's opinion, mi sused ìts dominating
positìon on the market by denying prìvate message forwarding agencies in the
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united Kingdom the possibiLity of forwarding messages from and to other
countries via the united Kingdom. This meant that users resident in other
rrlember States of the Community were prevented from taking advantage of the
differences in tariff structures, effective cost and exchange rate
fLuctuations offered by sending tetex messages to countries outside Europe vìa
the united K.ingdom. This decision marked the fi rst ìnstance of competition
rutes being appLied to the teLecommunications sector'
V.
40. There are fears that the batance of
predominantIy based on a market economy
economy wiLt be disturbed by the future
power between Member States which are
system and those based on a PLanned
accession of SPain and PortugaL-
It is
economies
be hoped that
the princiPLe
to
on
these countries wi Ll' in future di rect thei r
of free competition as enshrined ìn the EEC Treaty.
Vl. gompetition poIicy and state a'ids to undertakings
11. In 1982, the
t.lere approved.
down in ArticLe
onLy 13 cases.
commission received 232 apptications for a'id, of which 104
over 128 appticat'ions were processed using the procedure taid
93 of the EEC Treaty and negatìve ctearance was appLied in
The Comm.ission lightLy stresses the danger of consìderabLe damage to trade
between the fvlember States. Competition based on aids produces effects
simi Lar to state protectjonism. Existìng econom'ic difficutties are not
overcome but are merely shifted from one Member State to another' The
European parLiament wetcomes the fact that the Commìssion has devetoped
stringent guideLìnes to assess uhether ìt ìs possibLe to make exceptions in
retat.ion to the basic ban ìn principte on a'ids which distort or threaten to
distort competition. The Commission intends in future to demand the
repayment of aid granted ìn contravention of Community taw and thìs is a
weLcome deveLopment. At the same time it ìs aLso preparing guidetines to
estabtish which state air,: serve the common interest particuLarLy in cases
where deveLopments on the worLd market make a poLicy of economic incentives
for industriaL restructuring or conversion appropriate'
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Sectora Lr genela t glgl legicngL-ai ds
42. t.|e must draw a strìct distinction beth,een the various types of state
aid. 0ur efforts must be di rected against the distortion of competition
caused by subsid'ized steeL production and He must support the Commission's
efforts, made at Partiamentrs request, to restore the competitìveness of the
European steeI industry by restructuring and by reducing overcapacity.
It is, however, difficuLt to see why the steet ìndustry, where more
research and deveLopment is essentiaL for competitiveness to be maintained, is
to be excLuded under the aids code from the generaL programme to promote
research and deveIoPment.
43. The section on the restructuring effort contains detaiLs of the varying
intens.ity of individuaL types of aid. In view of the current situation,
these distinctions are not very hetpfut; loans and guarantees must atso be
counted in futI as aid.
The Comm'ission rejects the proposaL to fix the maximum amount of aid
according to the tonnage of reduced capacity. hle must agree with that'
However, it'is essentiaI to ensure a high degree of transparency of the aid
granted and to provide clear justifications to enabte the Commìssion to check
that equaI treatment is being applied.
44. BeLgium, France and Itaty have submitted sectoraI programmes in the
texti[e sector. Despite the appeaL stìtt pendìng on the 1982 decision to
approve the BeLgìan textite p[an, the Commission has approved both the Itatian
and Belgian programmes for 1983 - r.rith a number of provisos. The French
proposaL was rejected. The European ParLiament reaffirms its betief that a
proLìferation of aid should be avoided'in the interests of aLL concerned and
wiLL continue to express its opposition to the spread of sectoraL subsidies.
45. The reguLation on aid to the shipbuiLding industry hras extended for two
years on 21 December 1982. The Commission has undertaken to tighten up
controts on aid, to maintain the principLe of degress'ive aid and to resume its
work on a newr'improved directìve to be adopted in the near future'
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In vìe1.r of the d'ifficuLty of the sìtuation and continu'ing distort'ions of
competition in the shipbui Lding indust ry, the European ParLiament assumes that
the Commìssion's efforts wiIL continue to be directed towards reducirig the
voLume of aIL a'id incLuding the payment of compensation to offset Losses.
Pub L 'i c_undg rt a k'i nSg
46. In the case of publìc undertakings, the Commission works on the prìncipte
that the apptication of Community competition ruLes must not be restricted ìn
taw and comptains quite rightLy that the expansion of the pubLic sector is
coupLed wìth increasing State inf Luence on market activjt'ies. Further
investìgations are to be carried out into the financìaL reLations between the
Member States and theìr pubLic undertakìngs to ascertain whether state
measures inctude a proportion of aid. This is a flìost wetcome move.
In its judgment of 6 JuLy 1982, the Court of Justice confirmed the
dìrectìve on transparency and information has initiaLty been requested on the
automobi Ie, synthet'i c f i bres, text i Le machi nery, tobacco manufacturing and
shipbu'iLding 'industries. The resutts of these 'investìgations shoutd be
submìtted to the European Partiament as soon as possibte.
VII.The deveLopment of concentration, competition and competitiveness
t+7. The overaLI resuLts of investigations show that in the period 1973-1981
the [eveI of concentration wìthin the Community differed wìdety between
sectors but had remained retative[y stabLe on the whote. The - as yet -
incompLete investìgation into competitiveness has drawn attention to obvious
dange rs.
0f the many reLevant inhibitive factors identified by stud'ies of
indiv'iduaL sectors, the Commìssion draws attention first and foremost to the
negative impact of institutionaI framework condit'ions. The intens'ity of
competition and competitiveness are reduced when individuaI states introduce
regutations which encourage the compartmentaLizatìon of markets, when the
activitìes of pubL'ic monopoties favour home producers or when protectionist
measures are introduced to deaL with imports from third countries and even
f rom other f'lember States.
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The existence of a targe number of smatI and medium-sized undertakings on
an open worLd market, on the other hand, produces intense competition and a
generaU.y satisfactory Ievet of competitiveness amongst European manufacturers.
ytt[.Commissionrs reactions to the European ParIiamentrs resoLutions on the
Tenth and ELeventh Reports on Competition Poticy
48. The most striking omissìon by the Commission in the Twelfth Report is any
ref erence to ParIiament's suggestion f or a tt"ro-tìer system of judiciaI revieul
of Commission decisions, with a speciaI compet'it'ion court of first instance
deat'ing wìth questions both of tact and of [aw, and rlith the Court of Justice
mere[y re-examining questions of Law. ParLiament had asked the Commission to
report back on this in its resoLution on the Tenth Report, and the Commission
had responded favourabl.y in the Eteventh Report, stating that it was in favour
of the introduction of such a tyo-tier system of judìcìal review, and that it
beLieved !that in future this reform wou[d be the most appropriate way of
improving att administrative and legaI procedures retating to competition
cases I .
In its resoLution on the Eleventh Report Parliament then made (paragraph
47) a very specific request, reiterating its bel"ìef that a reform of this kind
cou[d uleLl. be h'igh[y desirabLe and caLLìng on the Commission rto report back
as soon as possibte, and at the [atest by the next yearrs report on the
practicaLities of such a proposaI and in part'icutar, on hot.l a competition
court might be constituted and on the exact range of its functionsr.
This request has been comptetely ignored by the Commission in the
Report and there is no reference to the subject at at[. Even if the
Commìssion has compLete[y changed its mind, and betieves the idea to
impract'icabLe, even though originaILy mooted by the Court of Justice
ìt shoutd at Least say so in ctear terms.
Twe Lfth
be
itseLf,
49. The second major quest'ion concerning procedures on which the Commission
has been particutarty unresponsive is that of expedìted Commission
procedures. Partiament has repeatedLy drawn attention to this issue, and
cited the growing backLog of pending cases of atl kinds to poìnt out the need
for reforms of some kind. In paragraph 52 of its resolution on the ELeventh
Report, totinstance, ParLiament asked the Commission to consider very
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specific recommendations for expediting its procedures, nameLy the amendment
of Regutation No. 17 ol 1962 so as to confer automatic exemption on an
agreement after the Lapse of a specified period or e[se to provide some form
of provisionaL exemption after an uncontested period (such as 90 days) from
the pubLication of an agreement and untiL a fìnaI decision by the Commission.
The Commiss'ionrs response has been extremety Iimited, and has been
restricted to a statement that it has increased the value of comfort
Iettc.t'i. Sucll .r t'r.,;l-rorì,,t. ls tot,rLty itrudt:t1tt,ttt'.
50. ParLìament's resoLution on the Tenth Report on Competition Poticy catted
for a reinforcement of the economic assessment capahiLities of DG IV and for
its economic research to be better integrated with the rest of its actìv'ities
(paragraph 47). There t"las no effect'ive response to this in the Eteventh
Report.
This then became a major theme in Partiament's resoLution on the ELeventh
Report which incLuded a whoLe section (paragraphs 54 to 58),'on strengthen'ing
and redirecting the Commission's economic research on competition poticy
matters!. This made a number of generaL criticisms, such as that the
dommission's economic research often seemed inadequateLy Linked to the
pract'icaL economic'issues encountered by DG IV in its everyday work, and that
whoLe areas of the Commissionrs activity, in particutar the controL of
government assistance to, and'interventìon in industry had not received any
systemat'ic anatytic treatment. It aLso noted that there had often been
considerabLe criticism of the Comm'ission's economic judgment in specific
cases, such as in its definition of relevant markets. The resotution put
forward some practicaL suggestions for more ctearLy directed research, and
aLso caLLed for particuLar subjects to be studied by outs'ide experts in the
'evoLution of concentration and competitiont series, and for more information
on the practicat use subsequentty made of these studies.
I
0ther paragraphs in the reso[ution renewed ParLiament's previous'caLL to
the Commission for great[y expanded research on the efficiency and
competitiveness of the Community economic structures, eslrc.ciaLLy irr a tlortd
context, and on the rote of publ.ic assistance and interventìon and of mergers
in the process of economic adjustmentr (paragraph 4) and aLso renewed
ParIiamentrs prevìous request rfor the overatt competitive effects of
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distribution agreements to be examined in greater detaiI from an economic
rather than just a [egal point of vieu, and for the compLex issues raised by
paraLteI importing to be more ctosety examinedr.
51. The Commission's response in the Twelfth Report'is essentìaLty Limited to
the comment (page 17, paragraph 2) that rother suggestions inc[ude the catL
... for intens'ified econom'ic research'. As regards the internationat aspects
of competition the Twetfth Report states (page 1? of the Introduction): rthe
Commission naturatLy takes account of the intensity of internationaI
competition ìn the common market or in a substantia[ part thereof'. There is
no subsequent discussion of how it achieves this. In the fìna[ paragraph of
the TweLfth Report, however, a general statement is made that'in future work
a more consistent attempt shou[d be made to incorporate the specific resuLts
of the programme of studies into the overatI assessment of the competitive
s'ituation in the Communityr. This shouLd indeed be forcefuIty pursued.
NevertheLess this rather tentative statement is not enough.
The Commission atso conctudes (paragraph 243) 'that whi[e the methodotogy
used in anaLysing the competitive situation has nou been fairty weIt
developed, the need to deepen its empiricat app[ication shoutd be ref[ected
more in future work'. A tentative start has been made in this report with
the discussions on pricing poLicy ìn the motor vehicte industry and in the
book trade, both sectors in which Partiament has taken a strong interest. It
is essentiaL to Link research more closeLy with practìcaI priorities.
UnfortunateLy there is stitL not enough evidence that the Commission has given
this matter its fu[[ attention.
The section at the end of the report on the devetopment of concentration,
competition and competìtiveness stiLL appears to take LìttLe or no account of
Parl'iamentrs suggestions, either those of a generat nature mde in both the
resotut'ions on the Tenth and Eteventh Reports2 rtot the specìfic comments made
in the resolution on the Eteventh Report. It is essentiaL that the
Commission provide a more comprehensive rep[y to ParIiament's criticisms.
52. In its resotution on the Eleventh Report Parliament made two special
requests which have not been proper[y taken account of by the Commission in
the section of the TueLfth Report (paragraphs 25 to 28) on smaLL and medium-
sìzed undertakings (SttUs), nameLy Partìamentrs request (paragraph 26 of its
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reso[ution) that the Commìssion carry out a more detai[ed review of the
appLication of the competitìon ru[es to smaLL and medium-sized undertakìngs
and of any speciaL probtems that have arisen, with a viebr to seeìng whether
further measures were needed, and ìts request that (paragraph 25 of its
reso[ution) the Commissìon shouLd pubLish a guide on Community competition
pot icy f or Sf*lUs, in the context of the 1983 Year of S[Us.
53. In paragraph 23 of its resolution on the Eteventh Report Parliament
expressed satisfaction that the Commiss'ion had inctuded a neh, sectìon on
non-Community undertakings, incLuding muLtinationatsr'in the EIeventh Report,
and requested that sections on these themes be'incLuded in subsequent annual
reports. The Twetfth Report contains no such section'
The resoLution on the ELeventh Report aLso contained another request
(paragraph 30) cLoseLy reLated to the theme of mu[tinatìonaLs, which depLored
the Commission.s failure to acknowLedge ParLiamentrs repeated ca[[s for action
to eLiminate transfer prìcing abuses, and asked the Commission to take steps
irr this lieLd. Itli:ì too dppears tcl travt ller.n ovortorlke,J by thp Crlmmis:iion.
54. partiament's resotutions on both the Tenth and ELeventh Reports on
Competitìon poLìcy asked for studies on the'impLications of Spanish and
portuguese accession to the community for competition potìcy. There t{as no
response from the Comm'ission in the ELeventh Report, no|is there now in the
Twetfth.
55. parLìament had caLLed in paragraph 60 of its resotution on the Eteventh
Report rmost emphaticatLy for the ìncLusion of a chapter on non-tariff
barriers...,. This has been expLicitLy rejected by the Commission in the
Twe Lfth Report.
56. The chapter in the TweLfth Report (Chapter V) on'Commission invotvement
.in work concerning restrictive practices and state aids ìn internationaL
trade'is very meagre. For instance, the sectìon (paragraph 157) on
cooperation between the Commission and the anti-trust authorities of
non-member countries mereLy states with the utmost blandness that tthere have
been bitaterat contacts with the anti-trust authorities of severat oECD member
countrìes in the course of Community proceedings'invoLving firms from those
countr.ies,, whi Le not discussing the issues raised by the extraterritoriaL
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appIication of competition taws on which ParLiament had asked the Commission
to act in paragraph 43 of its resotution on the ELeventh Report. As regards
the proposed internatjona[ code of conduct on the transfer of technology, on
which ParIiament had expressed regret that there tras currentLy dead[ock
(paragraph 42 of its resolution on the Eteventh Report) the Commission merely
notes (paragraph 156 of the TrleLfth Report) that the deadtock persists,
without exptaining why.
ParLiamentIs repeated requests (e.g. paragraph 38 of its resolution on the
i
Tenth Report and paragraph 45 of the resolution on the ELeventh Report) for
the Commission to contribute in estabtishing internationaI initiatives to
tackLe the probtems of internationat tax evasion, ftags of convenience and
other unfair practices in the fieLd of competition such as the existence of
marked internationaI differences in foreign investment incentives and
regutations, have been ignored by the Commission in the Twelfth Report.
57. The Commission has not yet responded to Partiamentrs request (paragraph 11
of its resolution on the Eteventh Report) for an analysìs of the state of
competition in the banking sector. The chapter on economic research does
say, however, that the Commission's programme of studies includes ptans for
anatysis of the study of competition in banking and ìnsurance. This proposaI
shou[d be put into effect as soon as poss'ible.
58. ParLiament had wetcomed (paragraph 37 of its resotution on the Eleventh
Report) the [ist of state aids to which the Commission had raised no objection
at the time but had asked for a futL t'ist of aLI current aids specifying their
duration. In the Twelfth Report this tist has nou been divided into aids
fa[Ling under the Treaty of Rome and under the European Coa[ and Steel Treaty,
but a fut[ [ist of atI current aids and their duration has stiLt not been
provided.
59. Partìament expressed regret (paragraph 2 of its resolution on the Eteventh
Report) that the Commission rlas being inconsistent 'in submitting certain
proposats to the appropriate committee of ParLiament for its comments before
officiaL pubLication of the proposaLs in the Officiat JournaL whi[e not
submitting others, and requested that atL such proposats be transferred to
ParL'iament's appropriate committee at a pretiminary stage. This request uras
forcefuLty reiterated in Partiament's resotution on the revision of Regutation
67 t67 .
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The issue ìs mentioned in the Tuetfth Report (paragraph 3) where the
Commission discusses its consu[tation po[ìcy with respect to its detegated
powers. This does not, however, fut[y respond to Partiament's request in one
sense, in that it faits to state whether it wiIL systematicaLLy consu[t
ParLiament'in this h,ay. There shoutd be a stronger undertakjng on this
matter from the Commission ìn the futurer given that the procedure woutd
remain an informat rather than formaI one.
IX. Finat remarks
60. It has been shown that an active poticy on competition'is preferabLy to
interventionist strategies for sotving structuraI p;'obIems in individuaL
sectors of the economy. Such interventionist poticies have atrays
degenerated 'in the past into conservative protectionist poIicies. Effective
competition, on the other'hand, produces greater incentives for innovation and
more mobi Lity. Competition caIts for adaptabi Iity, ftexibi Lity and mobi Iity
and thereby taci Litates the structurat changes vitat to the Communìty's
economy.
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